The loss of Jingzhou and Guan Yu’s subsequent defeat became a pivotal event in the power struggle of the Three Kingdoms, particularly triggering significant changes in the dynamics of the Shu Han.
Guan Yu’s loss of Jingzhou not only severely weakened the Shu Han’s military strength but also forced both him and his son to lose their positions. Furthermore, the defeat and retreat of Guan Yu made Zhuge Liang’s strategic plan to establish a foothold in Longzhong increasingly difficult. Subsequently, due to the pressure from the Dong Zhuo forces, Zhang Fei managed to temporarily stabilize the situation, but eventually, he too fell victim to the enemy’s attacks in 221 AD.
At the beginning of 220 AD, Guan Yu was caught off guard and made critical decisions that led to his downfall.
In the same year, regarding Liu Bei, his desire to avenge Guan Yu and reclaim Jingzhou led him to mobilize significant military forces against Dong Zhuo without careful planning, disregarding many warnings from those around him. Consequently, Liu Bei and the Shu Han forces suffered a significant defeat at the hands of the Dong Zhuo forces in August 222 AD. During this battle, numerous warriors perished, and the Shu Han forces also suffered considerable losses, forcing Liu Bei to retreat to Baidi.
According to historical records, the defeat at Di Lang was a substantial blow to Liu Bei’s ambitions, although later he reconciled with Dong Zhuo. Additionally, due to their inability to reclaim the vital territory of Jingzhou, the “Longzhong strategy” proposed by Zhuge Liang became increasingly challenging to implement. Moreover, the fact that the Shu Han forces were unable to engage in a decisive battle at Tian Shui only added to their difficulties. Due to excessive worry about the situation, Liu Bei’s health deteriorated significantly, eventually leading to his death in 223 AD.
Liu Bei’s intense desire to retaliate against Dong Zhuo and reclaim Jingzhou led to significant losses for the Shu Han.
After the heavy defeat at Di Lang, the military strength of the Shu Han significantly decreased, becoming “the weakest” among the three kingdoms of Cao Wei, Shu Han, and Dong Zhuo.
Historically, with such a situation, this was indeed the best opportunity for Cao Wei to eliminate Shu Han. Cao Pi, the son of Cao Cao, when ascending the throne of Cao Wei, faced a rare opportunity to lead an attack against Shu Han. However, the condition was that Cao Pi maintained a “peaceful stance,” completely avoiding using military force to eliminate Shu Han.
Many people under Cao Pi’s command did not understand why the current emperor would let such a rare opportunity go to waste. Moreover, even a talented strategist like Zhuge Liang had to wait 22 years to comprehend the underlying reasons behind Cao Pi’s decisions.
What does this mean?
22 years later, Zhuge Liang finally understood the decision made by Cao Pi.
Cao Pi’s decision to refrain from attacking Shu Han came after the devastating defeat at Di Lang.
Many believed that Cao Pi’s reluctance to engage Shu Han stemmed from his recognition of the potential repercussions of such an attack, given that the Shu Han forces were still formidable, especially in the face of the complexities of Han Zhong. This was indeed a difficult situation, making it impractical to carry out a large-scale invasion. Therefore, Cao Pi believed that even if there was a chance to eliminate Shu Han, both he and Cao Wei would have to pay a high price.
Yang Ping was a place where many significant victories for the Shu Han were achieved. Among them, he was often praised for his role in leading the troops against the forces of Cao Wei in 244 AD.
Cao Pi’s strategic understanding had to wait 22 years after the events of the Three Kingdoms to be fully realized. Specifically, in 244 AD, Cao Sang, an important official of Cao Wei, had mobilized 100,000 troops from Liao Zhou to launch an offensive against Han Zhong, intending to target the Shu Han. However, Cao Sang could not carry out this plan as the Shu Han forces were still around 30,000 strong, and Yang Ping only managed to secure a victory in the mountainous regions of Han Zhong.
When the troops from the capital arrived, the Shu Han forces had already cut off the Dong Zhuo troops’ access to reinforcements. At the same time, a plague broke out in the De Jiang and Guan Zhong regions, preventing the Dong Zhuo forces from adequately supplying their troops. Cao Sang and the Dong Zhuo forces had no choice but to withdraw.
After 22 years, finally, Zhuge Liang recognized the different approach that Cao Pi had taken regarding the decision to refrain from attacking Shu Han.
After this battle, the Dong Zhuo forces suffered severe losses, and the reputation and authority of Cao Sang also took a significant hit. The failures during the attacks on Shu Han contributed to the eventual downfall of Cao Sang under the reign of Zhuge Liang in 249 AD when the ruling family, the Cao clan, began facing the threat of internal strife that would eventually lead to their demise.
Clearly, after 22 years, a wise and strategic leader like Zhuge Liang finally realized that Cao Pi’s decision not to engage Shu Han after Liu Bei’s defeat at Di Lang was quite rational. It raises the question of whether the decision to not attack Shu Han was a fruitless effort. The ongoing situation in the realm was still precarious, and thus Cao Pi’s decision was undoubtedly a prudent one.
Sources: Sohu, 163, Baidu
